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Developments since the introduction of the 1988 asel Capital Accord have resulted 
in growing realisation that new forms of risks have emerged and that previously 
existing and managed forms require further redress. The revised Capital Accord, 
Basel II, evolved to a form of meta regulation – a type of regulation which involves 
the risk management of internal risks within firms. 
 
The 1988 Basel Accord was adopted as a means of achieving two primary objectives: Firstly, 
“…to help strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking system – this 
being facilitated where international banking organisations were encouraged to supplement 
their capital positions; and secondly, to mitigate competitive inequalities.” 
 
As well as briefly outlining various efforts and measures which have been undertaken 
and adopted by several bodies in response to the recent Financial Crisis, this chapter 
considers why efforts aimed at developing a new framework, namely, Basel III, have 
been undertaken and global developments which have promulgated the need for 
such a framework. Further, it attempts to evaluate the strengths and flaws inherent in 
the present and future regulatory frameworks by drawing a comparison between 
Basel II and the enhanced framework which will eventually be referred to as Basel III. 
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A.  Introduction 
 
The aftermath of the 2008 Financial Crisis (which commenced in 2007), has 
witnessed several reforms aimed at facilitating the introduction of legislation relating 
to higher levels in the quality and quantity of capital which banks are (and will be) 
required to retain. After it had been discovered that the global crisis had been partly 
triggered and aggravated as a result of : 
Insufficient level of capital and inadequate level of quality capital and; 
The need to provide for a definition of capital which would facilitate the absorption 
of losses (by regulatory instruments) on going and gone concern bases, 
 
the implementation of an “enhanced Basel II” framework, which is aimed at consolidating on 
the efforts achieved through Basel II, and which attempts to realise such an aim by drawing 
on the lessons learned from the Financial Crisis, is approaching its realisation date. 
 
Weaknesses in Basel II - weaknesses which surfaced during the 2008 Financial Crisis, are 
reflected through the features of the improved and enhanced framework which will be 
referred to as Basel III. Flaws and gaps in Basel II are largely attributed to banks’ extremely 
sensitive internal credit risk models which have contributed to pro cyclicality. As well as the 
need to address pro cyclicality, the second major issue in need of redress relates to the 
quantity and quality of capital – both issues having surfaced during the Financial Crisis. From 
this respect, Basel III differs from Basel II in relation to capital and measures aimed at 
mitigating pro cyclicality. For these reasons, the enhanced framework (Basel III) incorporates 
elements of improved quality and quantity of capital, as well as conservation buffers, counter 
cyclical buffers and additional capital requirements for systemically relevant institutions. 
 
 
This chapter is structured as follows: As well as providing an analysis and evaluation of measures 
which have been adopted by the Basel Committee and other standard setting bodies as a 
response to the recent financial crisis, section one is aimed at providing an overview of what 
Basel III entails as well as a background to why such a framework is necessary. 
 
Section two then provides a comparative analysis between Basel III and its predecessor, 
Basel II, by way of reference to certain features which distinguish both frameworks. 
Features such as Tier One Capital, Capital Conservation Buffers, Counter cyclical 
Buffers and additional capital requirements which have been imposed on systemically 
relevant financial institutions will be considered within this respect. 
 
The third section will then highlight problems which have been identified in relation to Basel II 
– as well as its beneficial attributes. It will also seek to justify the recent efforts and 
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decisions which have been approved by the Groups of Governors and Heads of Supervision 
and which are directed at raising the level of global minimum capital standards. 
 
The final section will then evaluate the Basel III framework and will draw conclusions 
based on the apparent benefits and gaps which have (so far) been identified and are 
attributed to Basel III. 
 
 
B.  Basel III and Recent Efforts to Address Pro Cyclical Effects of Basel II 
 
In response to the recent Financial Crisis and to the realization that capital levels (which banks 
operated with) during the period of the Crisis were insufficient and also lacking in quality, 2 the 
Basel Committee responded by raising the quality of capital – as well as its level. 3 
 
Further consequences of the recent Basel reforms also include: 4 
 
- A tightening of the definition of common equity  
- Limitation of what qualifies as Tier 1 capital  
- An introduction of a harmonized set of prudential filters  
- The enhancement of transparency and market discipline through new 
disclosure requirements.”  
 
The introduction of Basel II resulted in changes being made to the 1988 Basel Capital Accord 
to provide for a choice of three broad approaches to credit risk. 5 This was introduced into 
Basel II in view of the realization that “the optimal balance may differ significantly across 
banks.” 6 The increased focus on risk (and particularly credit risk), resulted from growing 
realization of the importance of risk within the financial sector. The range of approaches to 
credit risk – as introduced under Basel II, and which also exists for market risk, consists of 
the standardized approach (which is the simplest of the three broad approaches), the internal 
ratings based (IRB) foundation approach and the IRB advanced approach. 7 
 
Under the standardized approach, regulatory capital requirements are more closely 
aligned and in harmony with the principal elements of banking risk – owing to the 
introduction of wider differentiated risk weights and a broader recognition of 
techniques which are applied in mitigating risk. 8 
 
2 “Such a lack in high quality capital resulted in the raised levels of capitals and de leveraging of trading books (by 
many banks) amidst the Crisis.” See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank for 
International Settlements Publications, page 10 of 26 <http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100303.pdf> 
3 see ibid at page 11 
4 ibid 
5 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document Standard Approach to Credit 
Risk, Supporting Document to the New Basel Accord at page 1 January 2001 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca04.pdf> 6 ibid  
7 ibid; see also Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document “The Internal 
Ratings Based Approach” Supporting Document to the New Basel Capital Accord” January 2001 Bank 
for International Settlements Publications <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca05.pdf>  
8
 As a result, the standardised approach was intended to “generate capital ratios which were more 
aligned with the actual economic risks that banks are facing, compared to the 1988 Basel Accord – 
which should improve banks’ incentives to enhance their risk measurement and management 
capabilities and which should also reduce incentives for regulatory capital arbitrage.”  
See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document Standard Approach 
to Credit Risk, Supporting Document to the New Basel Accord at page 1 January 2001 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca04.pdf> 
However problems with Basel II internal credit risk models (which relate to the fact such 
banks’ internal credit risk models were overly sensitive in their implementation 9 for the 
calculation of regulatory capital, and generated pro cyclical effects) were realised during 
the recent Financial Crisis – as particularly exemplified by the case of Northern Rock. 
 
 
One principal topic which various bodies and international standard setters have sought 
to address relates to the issue of the pro cyclical effects generated by Basel II. 
Consequences of the realisation of the need for further amendments to Basel II, include 
efforts which have been undertaken by the European Central Bank – as evidenced by its 
report, the Financial Stability Review. Measures which were proposed in its Review – as 
a means of addressing gaps in Basel II, include the coupling of existing regulatory 
framework with capital insurance or liquidity insurance mechanisms. 10 
 
Further measures and actions which have been taken by the European Central Bank 
in response to the steep decline of global financial activity, witnessed most 
prominently in the aftermath of Lehman Brothers, include: 11 
 
- The reduction of key interest rates to unprecedented low levels  
- The introduction of a series of non standard measures aimed at supporting 
credit provision by banks (to the Euro area economy).  
 
These non standard measures – referred to by the ECB as “enhanced credit 
support”, consist of five elements, namely: 12 i) Extending the maximum maturity of 
refinancing operations (ii) Extending the eligible collateral list (iii) Provision of liquidity 
in foreign currencies (iv) Initiating a covered bond purchase programme (v) Providing 
unlimited liquidity in all refinancing operations at a fixed rate. 
 
 
Other efforts undertaken in response to the need to address gaps inherent in Basel II 
are reflected by the solutions and results generated and proposed by the Turner 
Review and the De Larosiere Report – such proposals and measures specifically 
being aimed at addressing and mitigating pro cyclical effects induced by Basel II. 
 
As well as those proposals which have been put forward by the Basel Committee (on 
Banking Supervision) – such proposals being aimed at introducing counter cyclical 
buffers, and which comprise capital and/or provisions, the introduction of forward 
looking provisions has also been supported by various bodies such as the Economic 
and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN). 
 
In view of its acknowledgement of the fact that tools which could be implemented as 
measures for mitigating pro cyclicality exist beyond those measures proposed by the Basel 
Committee, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) has taken up initiatives 
 
9 In their implementation to facilitate “the derivation of fundamental inputs for formulas which will 
determine the level of capital which large banks must retain.”  
10 European Central Bank, “Is Basel II Pro Cyclical? A Selected Review of the Literature” Financial Stability 
Review December 2009 at page 149 < http://www.ecb.int/pub/fsr/html/summary200912.en.html>  
11 See G Tumpel-Gugerell, „ The ECB’s Actions During the Recent Financial Crisis and the Policy Elements 
Needed for a Sound Recovery.“ Speech at the Conference on “How Can the EU and China Contribute to a 
Sound and Sustainable Global Economic Recovery?” at the Shanghai Expo, Shanghai 3 July 2010 at page 2 of 5   
<http://www.bis.org/review/r100709e.pdf>   
12 ibid  
which are related to measures such as dynamic provisioning and supplementary 
measures which include leverage ratios. 13 
 
According to observations of the BIS, 14 massive government support to re capitalise 
banks, to guarantee deposits and bank liabilities and to guarantee or buy the 
impaired assets of some of the largest financial institutions , arose from the inability 
of bank creditors and shareholders to distinguish between good and bad banks – 
which further resulted in the severe restriction of private sources of new capital. 
 
„The enhanced Basel II framework (which includes reforms aimed at increasing the 
quantity of capital – as well as improving the quality of capital),and the 
macroprudential overlay are (together) referred to as Basel III. „ 15 
 
Source : Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework, Bank for International  











































13 Committee of European Banking Supervisors, “Position Paper on a Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer” July 
2009 at page 2 < http://www.c-ebs.org/getdoc/715bc0f9-7af9-47d9-98a8-778a4d20a880/CEBS-position-
paper-on-a-countercyclical-capital-b.aspx>   
14 See ibid at page 10 of 26  
15See infra note 16 
16 See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank for International 
Settlements Publications, page 9 of 26 <http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100303.pdf> 
  












































C. Comparisons between Basel II and Basel III  
 
Some differences which have been highlighted by the Basel III Compliance 
Professionals Association (BiiiCPA) relate to four main headings and are as follows: 18 
 
1)  Tier One Capital 
 
With Basel II, the Tier One capital ratio which banks were required to retain was 4%. 
Under Basel III this will be 6%. Moreover, whilst Basel II stipulated a Core Tier One 
capital ratio of 2%, this will be 4.5% under Basel III and will comprise common equity 
before deductions. Such a 4.5% requirement will be phased in as follows: 
 
Core Tier One capital ratio (common equity before deductions) before 2013: 2% 
 
17 ibid at page 11 of 26  
18 See Basel III Compliance Professionals Association (BiiiCPA), „The Basel III Accord“ <http://www.basel-
iii-accord.com>  
Before 1st January 2013 = 3.5% 
Before 1st January 2014 = 4%  
Before 1st January 2015 = 4.5% 
 
In relation to both Basel II and III, the difference between the total capital requirement 
of 8% and the Tier One requirement can be achieved with Tier Two capital and other 
higher forms of capital. 
 
 
2) Capital Conservation Buffer 
 
Whilst no capital conservation buffer existed under Basel II, regulatory requirements under 
Basel III will require banks to retain a capital conservation buffer of 2.5% - as a means of 
“withstanding future periods of stress.” 19 As well as bringing the total common equity 
requirements to 7%, such a move “reinforces the stronger definition of capital agreed by 
Governors and Heads of Supervision in July and the higher capital requirements for trading, 
derivative and securitization activities to be introduced at the end of 2011.”  20 
 
The capital conservation buffer is to “sit on top of Tier One capital.” 21 Any bank 
whose capital ratio fails to retain the stipulated limit (which is in excess of the buffer), 
faces the threat of “restrictions” from supervisors on payouts which include dividends, 
share buy backs and bonuses. 22 
 
 
3) Counter cyclical Buffer 
 
The purpose of the counter cyclical buffer is considered to be the achievement of “the broader 
macro prudential goal of protecting the banking sector from periods of excess aggregate credit 
growth.”  23 Further, the counter cyclical buffer is aimed at compelling banks to commence with 
build ups of such extra buffers - as soon as supervisors are aware of excessive credit in the 
system which subsequently pose a threat (in triggering loan losses). 24 Banks are expected to 
“tap the buffer to offset such losses” without the immediate need to raise new capital. 25  
As is the case with the capital conservation buffer, counter cyclical buffers did not exist under 
Basel II. Basel III imposes a requirement of a counter cyclical buffer within a range of 0% 
 
 
19 The purpose of the conservation buffer being “to ensure that banks maintain a buffer of capital that can be 
used to absorb losses during periods of financial and economic stress. The closer banks’ regulatory capital 
ratios are to the minimum requirements, the greater the constraints on earnings distributions.” See Basel III 
Compliance Professionals Association (BiiiCPA), „The Basel III Accord : Capital Conservation Buffer “ 
<http://www.basel-iii-accord.com>   
20 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „Groups of Governors and Heads of Supervision 
Announce Higher Global Minimum Capital Standards” 12th September 2010 at page 1 of 7 
http://www.bis.org/press/p100912.pdf?noframes=1   
21 See Reuters, “Finalized Basel III Bank Capital Ratios” September 
2010 < http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE68B26D20100912>  
22 “The buffer is to comprise of common equity after the application of deductions like deferred taxes.”  
;ibid 
23 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „Groups of Governors and Heads of Supervision 
Announce Higher Global Minimum Capital Standards” 12th September 2010 at page 2 of 7 
http://www.bis.org/press/p100912.pdf?noframes=1   
24 See Reuters, “Finalized Basel III Bank Capital Ratios” September 
2010 < http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE68B26D20100912>  
25 ibid  
and 2.5% of common equity or “other fully loss absorbing capital will be implemented 
according to national circumstances.” 
 
4)  Additional capital requirements for systemically relevant financial institutions 
 
Another vital distinction between Basel II and Basel III is evident from the fact that under 
Basel III, “systemically important banks will be required to have loss absorbing capacity 
beyond the standards approved and announced on the 12th September 2010 and work in 
relation to this is expected to continue between the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and 
relevant Basel departments.” 26 Furthermore, the Basel Committee and the FSB are 
“developing a well integrated approach to systemically important financial institutions which 
could include a combination of capital surcharges, contingent capital and bail-in debt.” 27 
 
Total Regulatory Capital for systemically important banks is therefore considered to 
be: 28 [Tier One Capital Ratio] + [Capital Conservation Buffer] + [Counter Cyclical 
Capital Buffer] + [capital for systemically important banks] 
 
 
Furthermore, measures aimed at enhancing the level of quality of capital for systemically 
relevant financial institutions are evidenced by the Basel Committee’s recent efforts to 
enhance loss absorbing capacity of capital on both going and gone concern basis. 29 
 
A further distinction between Basel II and Basel III relates to Basel II’s focus on internal 
controls. The internal ratings based approaches 30 introduced under Basel II – as 
described under the first part of section B of this paper, were aimed at facilitating the 
ability of large banks to derive fundamental inputs for the formulas that will determine the 
level of capital they must retain – this also being achieved through an implementation of 
their individual credit risk models.  31 Even though Basel II gives greater prominence to 
capital regulation (than its predecessor) – through its facilitation of the implementation of 
advanced and developed techniques such as the two internal ratings based (IRB) 
methodologies (the Foundational IRB and the Advanced IRB methodologies), for the 
purposes of carrying out independent assessments of risk, its focus on internal models 
as a means of determining bank capitalization is to be contrasted with the recent efforts 











26 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „Groups of Governors and Heads of Supervision 
Announce Higher Global Minimum Capital Standards” 12th September 2010 at page 2 of 7 
http://www.bis.org/press/p100912.pdf?noframes=1   
27 ibid  
28 See Basel III Compliance Professionals Association (BiiiCPA), „The Basel III Accord : Capital 
for Systemically Important Banks Only “ <http://www.basel-iii-accord.com>  
29 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document “Proposal to Ensure the 
Loss Absorbency of Regulatory Capital at the Point of Non Viability” August 2010 < 
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs174.htm.>   
30 Which include the Foundational Internal Ratings Based (IRB) and the Advanced IRB methodologies  
31 See D Tarullo, Banking on Basel: The Future of International Financial Regulation (2008) Peterson Institute   
for International Economics at page 6 
Other components of the Basel III package which were approved in July 2010 relate 
to the definition of capital (including efforts aimed at improving the quantity and 
quality of capital), leverage ratio, risk coverage 32 and liquidity. 33 
 
According to the Basel Committee’s 2009 proposal on liquidity requirements, banks 
will be expected to meet the conditions imposed by two new liquidity requirements – 
a “short term requirement referred to as Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and a long 
term requirement called the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSF). 34 
 
These first set of global minimum liquidity standards (since no such international 
standards currently exist), will be introduced on as from 1 January 2015 (with respect 
to the Liquidity Coverage Ratio). The Liquidity Coverage Ratio is aimed at promoting 
banks' short-term resilience to potential liquidity disruptions. 35 
 
The Net Stable Funding Ratio, a “one year horizon” liquidity buffer” is to be tested and is 
expected to become mandatory as from January 2018. 36 It serves the purpose of addressing the 
mismatches between the maturity of a bank’s assets and that of its liabilities.  37 Such an effort to 
address challenges attributed to liquidity risk, if successfully implemented, would represent a 
huge step forward in rectifying some gaps which are inherent in Basel II. 
 
Apart from the all important issue of pro cyclical effects generated by Basel II, other 
problems associated with Basel II will be discussed in the subsequent section. 
 
 
D. Other Problems identified with Basel II  
 
1) Its use of mathematical models  
2) The fact that bank regulators do not have as much information (and 
particularly, risk-sensitive information) as banks- hence facilitating a process 
whereby banks are able to manipulate bank ratings  
 
 
Even though Basel II is acknowledged as having certain elements which are useful – 
particularly “the support for a leverage ratio, a capital buffer and the proposal to 
address pro cyclicality through dynamic provisioning which is based on expected 
losses”, other problems associated with Basel II, as identified by Blundell-Wignall and 
Atkinson (as well as these stated useful elements), include: 38 
 
 
32 “The proposals relating to risk coverage are aimed consolidating capital requirements for counter party credit 
exposures arising from banks’ derivatives, repo and securities financing activities.” See Reuters, “Finalized Basel 
III Bank Capital Ratios” September 2010 < http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE68B26D20100912> 
 
 
33 ibid  
34 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “An Assessment of the Long Term Economic Impact of Stronger 




See Reuters, “Finalized Basel III Bank Capital Ratios” September 2010 < 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE68B26D20100912> 
37 ibid  
38 A Blundell- Wignall and P Atkinson, “Thinking Beyond Basel III: Necessary Solutions for Capital 
and Liquidity” (OECD Journal Financial Market Trends, Volume 2010 Issue 1) at pages 4 – 7. For 
identified problems associated with Basel III, see page 2; ibid  
a) The lack of a “concentration penalty” under Pillar One 39  
b) The lack of “country specific risks” under Pillar One  
c) In relation to the above mentioned inherent flaw, that is, pro cyclicality, 
the most basic reason attributed to this, in their opinion, stems from the 
fact that judgements tend to underestimate risks in good times and 
overestimate them in bad times. 40   
d) The subjective nature of risk inputs  
e) Ambiguous and inconsistent definitions – largely attributed to the 
definition of capital. 41   
f) Under Pillars Two and Three respective identified problems include the 
fact that: Pillar Two is unlikely to be effective in a forward looking way 
and; that Pillar Three’s reliance on the notion that “disclosure and 
market discipline will penalize banks with poor risk management 
practices”, is likely to be inefficient since markets are not efficient. 42  
 
V. Conclusion  
 
 
How far has Basel III gone in addressing : 
 
I) The issues raised by Basel II  
 
 
Basel III has made considerable efforts to address a prominent issue raised under 
Basel, namely, pro cyclicality. As reflected under its macro prudential outlay, 43 Basel 
III has attempted to address pro cyclicality through measures aimed at redressing 
“stability over time.” Such measures include counter cyclical capital charges and 
forward looking provisions, capital conservation rules for stronger capital buffers and 
systemic capital surcharges for systemically relevant financial institutions. 
 
II) Problems which surfaced during the recent Financial Crisis  
 
The recent Crisis highlighted the fact that banks which have been complying with capital 
adequacy requirements could still face severe liquidity problems. From this perspective, it 
would have been expected that greater focus would have been given to the issue of liquidity 
than is currently the case. It could be said that the Basel Committee has tried to appease the 
 
 
39 In this sense, they argue that “ minimum capital requirements associated with any loan due to credit 
risk, simply rise linearly with the holding of that asset type – regardless of the size of the exposure. 
This infers that Pillar One does not penalise portfolio concentration – concentration issues being left to 
supervisors under Pillar Two.” See ibid at page 4   
40 More specific factors which were highlighted by Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson include:   
 Leverage ratios being dependent on current market values. If asset values do not 
accurately reflect future cash flows, this increases the likelihood that pro cyclicality will occur 
 The fact that banks’ risk measurement tend to be “point in time” and not 
based on an aggregate, holistic approach.See ibid at page 5 
41 Identified points in relation to such inconsistency and ambiguity include i) Regulatory adjustments for 
goodwill not being mandated to apply to common equity – but applicable to Tier One and/or a combination 
of Tier One and Two ii) Regulatory adjustments not being applied uniformly across jurisdictions – thus 
paving the way for greater possibilities for regulatory arbitrage iii) Banks not providing clear and consistent 
data about their capital; see ibid   
42 ibid at page 7  
43 Please refer to Table 3 “Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework” on page 5.  
needs and demands of various jurisdictions – in relation to those who had favored 
tougher rules and those who had appealed for not too stringent rules. 
 
III) “Too big to fail firms” and moral hazard  
 
As highlighted under section C of this chapter, ongoing initiatives are taking place to develop 
a well integrated approach to systemically important financial institutions and such efforts 






IV) Need for longer transition period by certain banks 
 
Whilst some elements of the recent announcements relating to the new framework (for 
Basel III) are considered by certain jurisdictions to be disappointing - owing to the fact 
that more stringent definitions for capital had been expected, the phase in periods have 
been welcomed by several jurisdictions. 44 Countries like Germany - where “silent 
participations” 45 are relied on (particularly by public sector banks), have welcomed the 
phase in periods as this would allow for such extensively used “silent participations” to be 
included – as well as giving them more time to adjust. However, Landesbanks with joint 
stock corporate forms (who had sought longer transition periods), are particularly 
affected by the new Basel II rules since they will not to be able to include such “silent 
participations” 46 as the highest quality form of capital from 2013. 47 
 
 
Are measures aimed at addressing liquidity timely enough? 
 
 
The need for an immediate increase in the quantity and quality of regulatory capital has not been 
advocated owing to the fact that “such an immediate goal for higher capital requirements would 
present risks in accentuating downturns.” 48 The build up of counter cyclical buffers into capital 
frameworks and provisioning practices is considered by the Bank for International 
 
44 See iMarket News,“Basel Committee: Banks Need 7% Core Tier One Capital as of 
2015” <http://imarketnews.com/node/19082>  
45 “Silent participations consist of non-voting capital. They are common in Germany – even though they are rare 
abroad. Because silent participations do not absorb losses as long as a bank is still in business, it is excluded 
from core capital – hence triggering a difficult situation for banks seeking to raise other forms of capital. In 
particular, public sector banks have relied strongly on such silent participations and feared competitive 
disadvantage as a result of the new requirements relating to Basel III. These funds at partly state-owned banks 
like NordLB [NDLG.UL] or Helaba ( LHTGg.F) will still count as capital under some conditions, while those for 
joint stock companies like HSH Nordbank [HSH.UL] and eventually LBBW [LBBW.UL] and BayernLB [BAYLB.UL] 
will not.” See ibid and A Schuetze, “Only Landesbanks Complain as Germany Backs Basel III” September 13 
2010 < http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE68C1FT20100913>   
46 For more in depth information on silent participations, see C Sureth and A Halberstadt „Shaping 
Profit Participation Rights and Silent Participation as Employee Share Ownership from a Tax and 
Financial Perspective (Steuerliche und finanzwirtschaftliche Aspekte bei der Gestaltung von 
Genussrechten und stillen Beteiligungen als Mitarbeiterkapitalbeteiligungen)“ June 2006 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=951155>   
47 See A Schuetze, “Only Landesbanks Complain as Germany Backs Basel III” September 
13 2010 < http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE68C1FT20100913>  
48 See Bank for International Settlements, “Financial System and Macro economic Resilience: Revisited” 
(Eighth BIS Annual Conference 25-26 June 2009) BIS Papers No 53, September 2010 at page 31 < 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap53.pdf>  
Settlements as presenting a “key” challenge since this will help to ensure that reserves are built 
up during periods of growth – to facilitate its withdrawal during periods of economic stress. 49 One 
way of achieving this , it is further argued, which is being explored by the Basel Committee, is 
through “the complement of strict minimum requirements that always hold, with, a long term 
target capital level to be achieved during periods of economic booms.” 50 
 
In addressing whether the measures aimed at addressing liquidity are to be implemented 
immediately, consideration is to be had to the legal requirements which presently operate 
in several jurisdictions which are subject to Basel II and III requirements. As with capital, 
consideration is to be had to the impact of limited transition periods (in the 
implementation of such rules). Whilst the implementation of measures aimed at 
addressing liquidity risks, is without doubt, of immense significance and importance, 
certain banks could be placed at greater disadvantage (than other banks) if not given 















































49 see ibid  
50 Transition between the two phases, it is further argued, would introduce a counter cyclical element whose 
adjustment mechanism can be readily designed in a way that is compatible with banks’ incentives – such 
compatibility being achieved through the imposition of limits on dividends, share buy backs and other 


































Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision  

































51 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „Groups of Governors and Heads of Supervision 
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